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What Determines the DPRK’s Anthracite Exports to China?: 
Implications for the DPRK’s Economy† 
By JONG KYU LEE* 
Anthracite exports have special value within the DPRK’s economy. In 
this paper, we focus on what determines the DPRK’s anthracite 
exports to China. We use panel data consisting of cross-section data 
from 30 provinces in China and quarterly time-series data from 1998 
to 2013. Controlling for all other variables that affect anthracite 
imports, the variable for steel production in China is robust and 
statistically significant. This is consistent with on-site interviews which 
indicate that much of North Korean anthracite is consumed by China’s 
steel industry. This implies that the North Korean authorities need to 
make adjustments to the foreign trade structure, as the import demand 
for anthracite in China may decline further. 
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I. Background and Objective 
 
t would not be an overstatement to say that the significance of China’s role with 
regard to foreign trade by North Korea completely changed following the 
successive economic sanctions imposed by Japan (2006), the UN Security Council 
(2006, 2009, 2012 and 2013) and those of South Korea’s May 24th Measure (2010), 
among others. As a result, China’s share of North Korea’s foreign trade continues 
to increase. According to a report by Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
(KOTRA), China accounted for 89.1% of North Korea’s foreign trade (excluding 
trade with South Korea) in 2013. The UN and IMF also recorded high figures of 
84.1% and 73.8%, respectively.1 Even with the inclusion of trade with South 
Korea (the Kaesong Industrial Complex), China’s share remained high at 77.2% 
according to KOTRA, 73.6% according to the UN and 65.4% according to IMF, 
reflecting the North’s extraordinary dependence on China. A common characteristic  
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of trade structures that are absolutely dependent on another country is that they are 
extremely vulnerable to external shocks. This is particularly true for North Korea’s 
economy, as the basic economic structure is based on exporting underground 
resources (mainly anthracite and iron ore) to China to secure the foreign currency 
needed to import food, crude and various daily necessities from China. 
From this perspective, North Korea’s export of anthracite has special value 
within the country’s economy. Although anthracite exports are not particularly 
competitive, it has been the main method to secure hard currency. In 2013, 
anthracite1 took a 47.2% share in general exports (HS-6), far exceeding that of 
iron ore (10.1%), women’s coats (3.5%) and squid (3.2%).2 Furthermore, with an 
accumulated total of 1.37 billion dollars, anthracite exports outstripped other 
foreign currency channels, including labour dispatch and dollar absorption from the 
informal sector.3 Ergo, hard cash secured through anthracite exports has enabled a 
stable supply of commodities into North Korea. Considering that North Korea’s 
economic structure leaves them no alternative but to rely on the outside for daily 
necessities, capital goods and strategic materials. It can be assessed that anthracite 
exports contributed significantly to the North’s three consecutive years of positive 
growth 4  and the stable downward trajectory of prices and exchange rates. 
Ultimately, anthracite exports have become the direct/indirect driving force that has 
maintained North Korea’s economy recently. 
The significance of anthracite exports is evident in the North Korean academic 
journal called ‘Economic Research’. Kang (2012, p.55) emphasized that “there 
needs to be [a] balance between import and export in order to acquire the necessary 
goods in a timely manner without becoming indebted to other countries,” while 
Choi (2013, p.34) wrote that “import trade is the process of buying the necessary 
goods through the use of foreign currency and export trade is the process of 
arranging the conditions needed for the development of import trade.” Additionally, 
Kim (2010, p.40) noted that “expanding the import of foreign currency does not 
have a purpose within itself but is [done] to efficiently secure the foreign currency 
necessary for spending.” Specifically, this represents reasoning that exporting is a 
prerequisite for the sufficient importing of required goods. Accordingly, stressing 
the export of competitive items, Choi (2013, p.34) emphasized the importance of 
exporting underground resources, stating that “extracting, processing and exporting 
these resources has substantial value as it will contribute to the development of the 
country’s economy as well as enhance the people’s livelihoods.” Cho (2013, p.5) 
directly referred to the importance of coal, stating that “the development of the coal 
industry will lead to the development of electricity and metalworking industries, 
which are crucial parts of [the] people’s economy.” 
However, despite its economic significance, there is a severe lack of quantitative 
 
1This paper classifies anthracite as HS270111 from the HS code 6 unit. 
2Korean International Trade Association trade statistics. www.kita.net 
3According to Greitens (2014), foreign currency acquired through the export of labour is about 150~230 
million dollars per year, and the revenue from the mobile phone industry reached 400~600 million dollars. Also, 
the Ministry of Unification (2013) and Kim et al. (2013) estimated, respectively, that the DPRK earned 86 million 
dollars through the Kaesong Industrial Complex and earned 21.7 million ~ 34.6 million dollars through Chinese 
travelers in 2012. 
4North Korea’s real economic growth rate (Bank of Korea): 0.8% (2011), 1.3% (2012), 1.1% (2013) 
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research on what elements within China drive the export of anthracite.5 The only 
assessment that has been made is that North Korea’s anthracite exports are influenced 
by China’s domestic market. As such, this paper will attempt empirically analyse 
what elements of the Chinese market influence North Korea’s anthracite exports. 
Sufficient empirical analysis in this area will enable South Korean policymakers to 
respond preemptively to changes in North Korea’s foreign economic policy and 
establish appropriate inter-Korean policies by accurately understanding internal 
information on North Korea’s economy. 
Anthracite is mainly traded to nearby regions considering the regional industry due 
to its high transportation costs. North Korean anthracite6 is primarily exported to 
Shandong Province and Hebei Province via the Nampo port and the Songrim port, 
located in South Pyongan Province (South-North Institute, 2014 Report on North 
Korean Resources, p.7). Hence, this paper will examine North Korea-China 
anthracite trade by looking at each Chinese region separately. This will allow for an 
assessment of the regional factors (China) which influence the trade of anthracite 
between the two countries. A quantitative analysis will be conducted based on panel 
data pertaining to each Chinese province from 1998 to 2013, when the exporting of 
anthracite to China began to expand in earnest. Chapter II will examine earlier 
studies of China’s domestic market and the literature on North Korea’s foreign trade. 
Chapter III will present the methodologies and data mainly used in the analysis. 
Chapter IV will report the results of the main empirical analysis and the basic 
statistical analysis. Finally, chapter V will summarize the quantitative analysis results 
and discuss the political implications.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
A. North Korea’s External Trade 
 
Research on North Korea’s overseas trade can be largely divided into three 
categories.7 The most common of these are studies of the determinants of trade, 
wherein the ‘gravity model’ is applied to North Korea. Next are studies of the 
effects of international sanctions on North Korea’s trade. Finally, there are studies 
of what effects the continuous expansion of overseas trade in the 2000s had on 
economic growth; there is a general consensus in this area. 
Firstly, we review the research on the determinants of external trade. Lee (2010, 
p.109) used the gravity model to examine the main determinants. According to this 
study, four main determinants affect North Korea’s trade: the income levels of 
North Korea and the trading country, geographical distances, whether there are 
North Korean residents in the trading country, and lastly whether the trading 
country has imposed economic sanctions on North Korea. Kim (2013, p.96) 
 
5There have been diverse attempts both at home and aboard to account for North Korea’s general foreign 
trade both quantitatively and statistically. These details will be discussed in the following chapter. 
625.80 million tons of coal is produced in North Korea per year, the majority of which is anthracite. Large-
scale anthracite production facilities are mainly concentrated around the coal mines of South Pyeongan Province. 
7This paper will omit explanations of references pertaining to types and comparisons of North Korean trade 
data sources.  
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explained that “according to gravity theory, the rapid surge in China-North Korea 
trade is due to the sizable increase in China’s economic scale.” Both studies 
pointed to the expansion of China’s domestic demand as the most important factor 
causing the increase in China-North Korea trade. In the paper by Lee (2006, 
pp.28~29) case, he stressed the importance of institutional support, including 
border trade-based tax cuts in addition to factors based on the gravity model. 
Upon an examination of the research on the effects of international sanctions, 
there is a general consensus that sanctions have almost no impact.8 In particular, 
many view that China’s loose sanctions on the North diminish the effects of 
international sanctions. Jeong and Bang (2009, pp.43~44) conducted an empirical 
analysis of panel data focused on the North Korean sanctions imposed by the 
international community in 2006 and found that North Korea’s overseas exports 
expanded even in the aftermath of the sanctions. Nanto and Manyin (2010) asserted 
that China did not rigidly enforce tariff regulations on dual-use products and luxury 
items, thus diminishing the effects of the sanctions. Sung (2009) also found that the 
sanctions failed to have an impact in terms of external performance, as China filled 
the voids of trade partners. Lee and Hong (2013, pp.94~95) also discovered via on-
site investigations that China “did not want to impose harsh sanctions which could 
weaken the North Korean regime and cause economic chaos.” 
Undoubtedly, there are studies such as that of Lee and Lee (2012, p.31), which 
determined that South Korea’s May 24th Measure led to North Korea’s excessive 
exports of strategic materials to China, which in turn negatively influenced North 
Korea’s economic structure in the mid- to long-term.9 On the other hand, upon his 
empirical analysis of the effects of Japan’s sanctions, Lee (2010, p.140) found that 
“there are implications [pertaining to] … the probability that sanctions imposed by 
Japan affected North Korea’s imports rather than its exports.” This shows 
specifically that although sanctions imposed by individual countries had an impact, 
North Korea was able to avert a crisis by replacing the lack of trade with an 
expansion of trade with China.  
There is also a general consensus with regard the fact that the expansion in North 
Korea’s external trade was the driving force behind its overall economic growth. 
Kim (2011) used time-series data from 1990 to 2009 to deduce that North Korea’s 
exports to China contributed to its long-term growth. Lee and Hwang (2009) also 
used time-series data from 1970 to 2007 to find that North Korea’s external trade 
contributed significantly to its economic growth. 10  Kim (2013) asserted that 
China’s increased demand and a rise in international raw materials prices bolstered 
North Korea’s exports and thus contributed to the expansion of production and an 
influx of foreign currency, with imported industrial commodities contributing to 
the increase in production. 
However, a new argument has recently emerged regarding the possibility of 
North Korea experiencing ‘immiserizing growth.’11 Lee (2006) noted that China’s 
 
8This can be easily inferred from the yearly expansion in the North Korean trade volume despite the sanctions 
imposed by the UN, Japan, US and Korea.  
9Lee and Kim (2011) empirically demonstrated that North Korean arms exports decreased following the 
sanctions (UNSC resolutions 1717 in 2006 and 1874 in 2009).  
10However, this research was noted for its problems in selecting estimations for the nominal GDP rather than 
the real GDP as the explained variables. 
11Bhagwati (1958) pointed out that for countries which export primary goods, the level of welfare may 
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rapid growth from 2000 to 2004 prevented the price of primary commodities from 
falling and as such deterred immiserizing growth in North Korea. However, more 
recently, declining prices of North Korean anthracite and iron ore have been 
partially witnessed despite the increase in exports, as the demand from China is 
unable to support the supply (Lee 2014, p.53). Moreover, it can be said that the 
possibility of immiserizing growth in North Korea has increased given expectations 
that China will be unable to sustain the rapid growth of its economy and anthracite-
related industries. 
In sum, research on the determinants of North Korea’s external trade can be 
comprehensively organized as follows. North Korea’s overseas trade is positively 
related to China’s rapid growth and expansion of domestic demand, offsetting the 
negative effects of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, as 
expansion in trade ultimately leads to recovery and growth of the economy, the 
increased trade with China was a significant underlying contributor to North 
Korea’s growth in the 2000s. However, there are limitations to sustainable growth 
in an economy that bases the expansion of exports on underground resources. Even 
if the economy is able to maintain exports that are heavily dependent on 
underground resources, it cannot be a factor for mid- to long-term sustainable 
growth, as it carries the possibility of immiserizing growth, in which the terms of 
trade deteriorate and welfare declines. 
 
B. Demand for Anthracite Imports in China 
 
There is a lack of research that quantitatively analyses North Korea’s anthracite 
exports as a separate entity. Instead, research on the levels of China’s coal and 
anthracite12 demand can be found both domestically and internationally and can be 
used as a substitute for the determinants of North Korea’s anthracite exports. 
Currently (based on 2010 data),13 coal accounts for approximately 70.5% of 
China’s energy consumption14 and it is mostly utilized in the production of electricity 
(56%), steel (15%), cement (13%) and chemicals (5%). Cattaneo et al. (2011) also 
noted that consumption occurred in the production of electricity, metals and 
chemicals, and construction. According to the EIA,15 despite being the world’s 
largest coal producer, producing roughly 3.65 billion tons of coal (based on 2012 data), 
China’s demand for coal has increased sharply since the early 2000s. Accordingly, 
China transitioned from a coal exporter to coal importer in 2008. For anthracite, China 
was already an importing country in 2005 on the back of the rapidly increasing 
imports of less expensive anthracite from North Korea and Vietnam. 
To explain the cause of the increase, the majority of research points to China’s 
increased demand, the decline in domestic production, and weakening price 
 
decline as a result of weakening trade conditions due to a decline in export prices despite an expansion in exports. 
12The World Coal Association stipulates that the carbon content of coal must be over 70%: peat (60%), lignite 
and sub-bituminous coal (70%), bituminous coal (80~90%), anthracite (95%).   
13However, the Chinese government announced plans to cut the rate of coal consumption to 65% by 2017.  
14Bae and Ahn (2012), ‘Background and Implications of the Rapid Increase in China’s Anthracite Import,’ 
Global Economy Brief, Bank of Korea, 2012~22.  
15U.S. Energy Information Administration (International Energy Statistics). www.eia.gov 
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competitiveness. Bae and Ahn (2012, pp.4~7) noted that “despite the increased 
demand for coal, industrial restructuring triggered a decrease in domestic 
production and a discrepancy in the demand and supply of high-quality coal, and 
imports surged on the back of the weakening price competitiveness of domestic 
coal.” Specifically, domestic production failed to meet the increase in domestic 
demand, leaving no alternative but to increase imports. Likewise, Bae (2011, 
pp.50~53) pointed to the repercussions of China’s rapid economic growth as the 
reason for the increase in coal imports and indicated that the reason China 
particularly focused on North Korean anthracite was because “in the midst of the 
heated global competition to secure resources, it was important for China to receive 
stable supplies from friendly nations and also, the transportation costs using ports 
was more efficient than the cost of transporting coal within China.”16 Tu and 
Johnson-Reiser (2012) also found that the “increased demand led by China’s rapid 
industrialization,” “limitations of China’s railway transportation” and “the 
restructuring of mid-size to small coal mining” operations were the reasons behind 
the rapid increase in China’s coal imports. 
Additionally, there have been diverse attempts to estimate the increase in the 
demand for coal imports quantitatively. Masih and Masih (1996) used dynamic 
OLS based on data from 1953 to 1992 to prove that mid- to long-term prices and 
income flexibility were connected. Chan and Lee (1997) applied an error correction 
model using time-series data from 1953 to 1994 to estimate that China’s demand 
for coal would increase from 1.2 billion tons in 1994 to 1.48 billion tons in 2000. 
Moreover, in an effort to estimate China’s energy demand, Crompton and Wu 
(2005) utilized VAR (Bayesian vector autoregression) based on data from 1956 to 
2003 and predicted that coal demand will increase by 3.3% from 2004 to 2010. 
From a slightly different perspective, research has also focused on efficiency rather 
than on the total amount of energy consumption. In some of these studies, it has 
been determined that the energy consumption per person or rate of increase in 
energy consumption compared to GDP will gradually decline as energy efficiency 
gradually increases. The findings of Kambara (1992), Garbaccio et al. (1999) and 
Chu et al. (2000) are all in good agreement with this conclusion. 
In contrast to the aforementioned findings, which were the results of estimations 
of China’s total coal demand, work by Cattaneo et al. (2011) was special in that it 
considered provincial coal demand levels separately when estimating the differing 
levels of demand according to the region. Above all, because the distribution cost 
of coal accounts for a large portion of its price, coal trade is mainly conducted 
between regions that are in close geographical proximity. Reflecting this 
characteristic, this model attempted to reflect reality by considering regional sizes, 
GDPs and the weights of heavy industries as well as the spatial correlation between 
regions as factors that increase the demand for coal.17 Moreover, based on yearly 
and regional data from 1995 to 2002,18 it was found that the regional size, GDP, 
 
16While China’s transport of coal by rail increased by 4.6% between 1980~2010, transportation by sea 
increased by 19.0% (Tu and Johnson-Reiser 2012, pp.5~6).  
17In order to consider the influence of regions, two variables were taken into consideration. First, 1 was 
assigned when two regions share the same border, and 0 was assigned if not (w1). Secondly, the decay function 
according to distance, specifically, the Euclidean distance, was applied if the distance between the two regions was 
less than 600km, with 0 applied for those with distances greater than 600km (w2). 
18Twenty two provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two special administrative regions. 
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weight of heavy industry and the degree of spatial autocorrelation all had a strong 
positive (+) relationship with the coal demand level. 
 
III. Methodology and Data 
 
A. Methodology 
 
Based on a quantitative model, in this research attempts are made to examine the 
factors that influence North Korean anthracite imports by region in China. Similar 
to the demand levels for other raw materials, the demand for anthracite is not 
important per se but is closely connected to the demand for final goods and 
changes with it.19 Specifically, anthracite demand is influenced by the production 
volume of the final goods and the share of anthracite used per final goods. Tilton 
(1990) used the total GDP, MCP (material composition of products), and PCI 
(product composition of income) to estimate the demand for steel. When similar 
reasoning is considered, it can be assumed that the demand for anthracite will also 
be affected by these factors and will be changed by them.  
 
(1)                     MCPt= DAtFPt  
 
First, the share of anthracite in the final product (MCP) can be expressed as (1). 
Here, DAt (demand for anthracite) refers to the industrial demand for anthracite, 
and FPt (final product) refers to the final product of a specific industry. In MCP 
cases, the results may vary according to developments in science and technology, 
the emergence of anthracite substitutes, and discoveries of new processes. 
 
(2)                     PCIt= FPtGDPt 
 
Next, the share of the final product in the total economy can be expressed as (2), 
which may vary according to changes in GDP and/or policies based on changes in 
consumer preferences. Based on this, the demand for anthracite in all industries (id) 
can be summarized by the following identical equation: 
 
(3)               DAid,t= (GDP)t ∑ (MCP)id,t(PCI)id,t
n
id=1  
  
Here, if (1) and (2) are combined, the equation for anthracite demand can be 
expressed as (3), and it is possible to predict the demand for anthracite using GDP 
projections, the share of anthracite in the final product (MCP), and the share of the 
final product in the total GDP (PCI). Consequently, it can be deduced that one of 
the most important determinants of anthracite is the demand for final products. 
If this is rearranged into China’s provincial demand for North Korean anthracite, 
it can be expressed as a functional equation, as in (4). 
 
19Refer to Ball and Loncar (1991), Roberts (1990), Tilton (1990), Cattaneo et al. (2011). 
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(4)                IMDAi,t=∫ ( Zi,t, Xi,t, CHi, NKt)  
In the equation above, IMDAi,t represents the demand for anthracite of a specific 
Chinese region (i) in each quarter (t); the demand is limited to the demand for 
imported North Korean anthracite. Considering that anthracite is traded between 
regions that are in close proximity, analyzing China’s market by region is 
significant. First, Zi,t represents the demand for the final product, which influences 
the demand for anthracite. Anthracite is mainly used in the production of electricity, 
steel, cement and fertilizer. As such, these will be important determinants of the 
level of demand for North Korean anthracite imports. In addition, Xi,t denotes the 
set of control variables. For example, the economic condition of each specific 
region is expected to have an indirect impact on the demand for anthracite imports. 
This can be estimated by the quarterly GDP of each region. Also, the unit price of 
anthracite imports, the traditional determinant of demand, can be a determining 
factor for the demand level. Additionally, as China is a producer as well as an 
importer of anthracite, it is highly probable that there is a close connection between 
the production volume of a specific region in China and the level of anthracite 
import demand. As such, it is possible that the regions’ anthracite production 
volumes can also influence demand as a substitute.20 Furthermore, geographical 
variables such as the distance between regions (CHi) and variable specific to North 
Korea (NKt) such as sanctions imposed by the international community, which 
reflect the trade with North Korea according to the period, should be included. The 
next section will examine in detail the dependent variables and independent 
variables that will be used in the empirical analysis. 
 
B. Data 
 
This paper focuses on specifically which demand factors within China affect 
North Korea’s anthracite exports. To do so, provincial and quarterly panel data 
from China was used.21 Through this process, the effects of different variables that 
influence trade between China and North Korea can be understood in more detail, 
and the efficiency of the estimations is enhanced as the degree of freedom is 
increased. Moreover, the characteristics of specific regions that may be overlooked 
if China is examined as a whole can be reflected, thus resolving the problem of 
omitted variable bias (Wooldridge 2003). The panel data used in this analysis 
encompasses data from a total of 30 regions which consist of 22 provinces, four 
metropolitan cities and four autonomous regions (excluding Tibet), from 64 
quarters ranging from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2013. 
However, the actual number of observations will be much lower because there 
were only 17 provinces that have records of trade with North Korea. Moreover, in 
 
20There are problems in making domestic anthracite production as a substitute as production regions (mainly 
central regions) and consumption region (mainly eastern regions) differ from each other. As such, it may be an 
inappropriate variable to use in the analysis of each province. For detailed contents refer to “basic statistics” in this 
paper.  
21As the import of coal of each province estimated, comparisons can be made with Cattaneo et al. (2011)’s 
research among preexisting research.  
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some provinces, there were only a few periods with records. 
In order to determine the factors which have affected North Korea’s anthracite 
exports, the estimation equation incorporated North Korean anthracite export 
amounts for each province as the dependent variable and regional and economic 
characteristics as control variables. Also used as the dummy variable were the 
periods during which the UN Security Council imposed sanctions. Specifically, 
which factors from among the regional economy, the demand for anthracite (e.g., 
production of electricity, steel), prices (price of anthracite), substitutes (domestic 
anthracite production), geography (the distance from North Korea) and North 
Korean factors (the periods of UN sanctions) had the greatest impact on North 
Korea’s anthracite imports were examined. The estimation method used general 
panel model estimation techniques, including a fixed-effects model and a random-
effects model. The equation used for the estimation is shown below. 
 
(5)       ln(ex)i,t =βo+β1 ln(ep)i,t +β2 ln(sp)i,t +β3 ln(pgdp)i,t + 
β4 ln(price)i,t + β5ln (ap)i,t+β6ln (dist)i+β7UNt+μ 
 
The data used was primarily from KITA’s trade statistics database and from the 
CEIC’s (Euromoney Institutional Investor Company) China Premium database. 
Additionally, Globefeed was used to determine the distance between each Chinese 
province and North Korea. Of course, because statistical data from August to 
November 2009 have been omitted from KITA’s data, as discussed in Lee et al. 
(2013), there is a possibility that the rapid decrease in North Korean trade may 
appear exaggerated.22 In order to offset this issue, this paper will use revised data 
to control for this effect. 
After examining each variable closely, I chose to use North Korea’s export 
anthracite volume by province at each quarter as dependent variable. The 
electricity production (ep) and steel production (sp) of each particular region were 
used as an indicator of anthracite demand. These two industries were selected, as 
they account for the majority of anthracite consumption. The economy of each 
region is expected to have a positive (+) relationship with anthracite demand, and 
electricity and steel production are also expected to have positive influences. 
Quarterly GDP (pgdp) for each province was used as the explanatory variable to 
reflect the economy of each region. On the other hand, domestic anthracite 
production (ap), which can be considered as a substitute, is expected to have a 
negative (-) relationship with import demand, as is the price of North Korea’s 
anthracite. Additionally, as anthracite trade entails high transportation costs, the 
fact that anthracite is traded between close regions was taken into consideration, 
and the distance between North Korea and the each Chinese region (dist) was used 
as a simple indicator. Based on the fact that trade increases as distance decreases, 
the distance from North Korea is expected to have a negative (-) relationship in this 
regard. In order to control for the international community’s sanctions on North 
Korea, which can be an obstacle to trade between North Korea and China, the 
 
22As it happens, Kim Jong Il prohibited the export of anthracite from North Korea starting in August 2009. 
Although the ban continued until August 2010, it seems that it could not be banned completely. Regardless, given 
this impact, North Korea’s anthracite exports in 1H 2010 declined by 59% yoy (based on US dollars).  
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impact of UN sanctions was included as a dummy variable. Specifically, 1 was 
applied to quarters when UN sanctions were imposed, and 0 was applied to 
quarters without sanctions.23 In particular, strict criteria are required because the 
researcher’s discretion can influence the UN sanction dummy; as such, 1 will be 
applied to only UN Security Council resolutions.24 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
A. Basic Statistical Analysis 
 
Before presenting the results of the regression analysis, this section will examine 
the basic statistics and present conditions of a total of 30 regions. First, Table 1 
presents the basic statistics of the data. A salient aspect is that there is a significant 
difference in the number of observations between the dependent and independent 
variables. There are only 360 observations of the dependent variable for North 
Korea and 335 observations for Vietnam. In fact, 17 regions recorded anthracite 
imports from North Korea, while not even one case was recorded in the remaining 
13 regions (Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1—DATA SUMMARY 
Variables Unit Obs Mean Std. Deviation 
Anthracite Import (Volume)     
Anthracite Imports from the UK Ton  360 170,114 334,006 
Anthracite Imports from Vietnam Ton  335 531,473 863,122 
Demand for Final Goods     
Electricity Production Billion kWh 1,978     22.2     19.8 
Steel Production Thousand ton 1,556 4,656.5 6,993.1 
Import Price     
NK Import Price $/ton  360    60.7    45.5 
Vietnam Import Price $/ton  335    78.4   321.0 
Substitute Goods     
Coal Domestic Production Thousand ton 1,441   14,505  23,988 
China’s Anthracite Exports Ton  630  122,924 213,118 
Economic Condition     
Real GDP Billion yuan 1,697    244.9   270.4 
Geographical Factor     
Distance from Pyongyang km 1,984  1,579.8   270.4 
Distance from Hanoi km    
Sanction Effect     
UN Security Council Resolution Dummy 1,984    0.08   0.27 
Source: KITA, CEIC, Globefeed. 
  
 
23For literature that primarily investigates the impact of UN sanctions, refer to Lee and Kim (2011), Jeong and 
Bang (2009), Lim (2013), Sung (2009), Yang and Ha (2012). 
24Five resolutions were observed in total, i.e., UNSC resolutions 1695 in the third quarter of 2006 (the 
Taepodong-2 launch); 1718 in the fourth quarter of 2006 (the first nuclear test); 1874 in second quarter of 2009 
(the second nuclear test), 2087 in the fourth quarter 2012 (the Kwangmyongsong-3 launch) and 2094 in the first 
quarter 2013 (the third nuclear test). 
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TABLE 2—CHINA’S ANTHRACITE IMPORTS 
Year Imports from North Korea  (thousand tons) 
Imports from Vietnam 
(thousand tons) 
Total Imports 
(thousand tons) 
1998      27.3 (62.5%)      16.4 (37.5%)          43.7 (100%) 
1999      12.2 (08.5%)     130.8 (91.4%)           143.0 (100%) 
2000        8.1 (03.8%)    205.0 (96.2%)           213.2 (100%) 
2001       86.4 (19.5%)     357.1 (80.5%)         443.6 (100%) 
2002    406.5 (14.7%)  2,241.6 (81.0%)   2,768.8 (95.6%) 
2003    745.3 (22.0%)  2,492.0 (73.7%)   3,382.8 (95.7%) 
2004  1,571.3 (20.1%)  6,116.2 (78.2%)      7,819.3 (98.3%) 
2005  2,804.2 (21.9%)  9,926.3 (77.6%) 12,789.6 (99.5%) 
2006  2,480.7 (11.0%) 20,078.6 (88.7%) 22,625.9 (99.7%) 
2007  3,740.9 (13.2%) 24,611.6 (86.6%) 28,414.2 (99.8%) 
2008  2,536.6 (13.1%) 16,843.9 (86.9%) 19,387.9 (100%) 
2009  2,972.2 (08.6%) 24,077.9 (70.0%) 34,388.1 (78.7%) 
2010  4,603.4 (17.4%) 18,046.6 (68.2%) 26,461.2 (85.6%) 
2011 11,047.6 (30.6%) 22,032.8 (61.0%) 36,130.3 (91.6%) 
2012 11,807.1 (34.3%) 17,423.1 (50.5%) 34,471.0 (84.8%) 
2013 16,494.5 (41.6%) 13,142.0 (33.1%) 39,646.8 (74.8%) 
Note: The share of China’s anthracite imports from each country is in parenthesis. 
Source: KITA. 
 
China’s anthracite import market was always led by Vietnam, but as a result of 
the rapid increase in North Korean anthracite imports in recent years, North Korea 
became the largest exporter of anthracite to China,25 though anthracite imports 
from both countries have been on a downward trajectory since 2009 owing to the 
increase in the imports of Australian and Russian anthracite. Nonetheless, North 
Korea and Vietnam account for the bulk of China’s anthracite import market, 
taking up approximately 74.8%.  
With regard to the proportion, anthracite from these two countries appears to 
have been considered a substitute, but in the aspect of its final destination it seems 
that they are not. North Korea’s high-quality anthracite is mainly used in the steel 
and ceramics industries, while Vietnam’s lower quality anthracite is mostly used in 
power plants. 26  Furthermore, the main export destinations of both countries’ 
anthracite differ. As such, rather than regarding North Korean and Vietnamese 
anthracite as interchangeable, they should be regarded as substitutes for the 
anthracite production of each region. 
For a more detailed analysis, the paper will look into the anthracite import 
volume of each region. The anthracite import of 17 eastern regions that are in close 
proximity were mainly observed, and from those it was determined that trade was 
mainly concentrated in the eastern coastal regions, such as Shandong, Liaoning, 
Hebei and Jiangsu (Figure 1). The remaining 13 regions had no trade and in two 
regions imports were only recorded in one quarter, once again confirming that 
geography is an important factor in anthracite trade. It is expected to be used in 
steel and ceramic industries. On the other hand, for Vietnamese anthracite, it was 
 
25In July of 2013, the Vietnamese government raised the export tariff from 10% to 15%; as such, changes are 
to be expected.   
26“In order to be used by steel and ceramics companies, anthracite must essentially go through a coal-washing 
process, but as Vietnam has very few or no coal washing facilities, inevitably it is sold to power plants at low 
prices (Korea Resources Corporation, Inter-Korean Resource Cooperation Dept. Head Bhang Gyung Jin interview, 
July 2014).  
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FIGURE 1. ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA: MAIN PROVINCES 
Note: Imports for quarters are recorded in Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Guandong, Guangxi, Hebei, Heilongjiang, 
Hainan, Jiangsu, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang (15 Provinces); In the case of Shanxi 
and Inner Mongolia, imports were only recorded in one quarter (2 Provinces); Imports are zero for all quarters 
in Chongqing, Gansu, Guizhou, Hainan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Ningxia, Quinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, 
Xinjang, and Yunan (13 Provinces).  
Source: KITA. 
 
mainly exported to 17 southern regions and was concentrated in the south, which is 
close to Vietnam. These areas include Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan and Hunan 
(refer to Figure A1). It is expected to be used in power plants. 
Table 3 examines the recent anthracite import volume, the weight of imports, 
import prices, and each region’s share in North Korea’s total anthracite exports for 
the four main recipients of North Korean anthracite. According to the table, 
Shandong imported the largest amount of anthracite from North Korea, at 7.2 
million tons, representing 92.3% of the region’s total anthracite imports and 44.1% 
of North Korea’s total anthracite exports. In particular, the demand mainly derived 
from Rizhao Steel in Rizhao, ceramic and nickel smelting companies in Linyi, and 
ceramic companies in Zibo.27 Hebei is the next largest importer, with 50.0% of the 
region’s anthracite coming from North Korea, accounting for 23.3% of North 
Korea’s total anthracite exports. The steel companies in Tangshan and Tianjin are 
the main source of demand. Liaoning imports 69.4% of anthracite from North 
Korea and accounts for 15.3% of North Korea’s anthracite exports. Moreover, 
although the transportation cost is the highest for Jiangsu, as it is in the most 
 
27Korea Resources Corporation, Inter-Korean Resource Cooperation Dept. Head Bhang Gyung Jin interview 
(July 2014).  
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TABLE 3—ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA: MAIN PROVINCES (2013) 
Province 
Volume 
 
(thousand ton) 
Import Share in the 
Province 
(%) 
Import Price in the 
Province 
($/ton) 
Share in DRPK’s 
Anthracite Export  
(%) 
Shandong 7,200 92.3 81.9 44.1 
Hebei 3,800 50.0 82.4 23.3 
Liaoning 2,599 69.4 89.0 15.3 
Jiangsu 2,400 70.6 85.0 14.7 
Source: KITA, CEIC. 
 
southern part relative to the six eastern provinces, there is demand for anthracite 
there as well due to the development of the steel industry, which includes Baosteel 
(South-North Korea Association Report no. 3, pp. 6). The region procures 70.6% of 
anthracite from North Korea and accounts for 14.7% of its total anthracite exports.  
As noted from the current imports of each region’s and the main source of 
demand, North Korean anthracite imports are mainly led by steel and ceramics 
companies. In addition, as the price and quality is relatively high, the ratio of North 
Korean anthracite used at power plants which use low-quality anthracite is 
proportionately low. 
The following paragraph will examine the characteristics of the regions that 
import large volumes of anthracite. When looking at China as a whole, 26 regions 
recorded anthracite imports least once during the period, and they were 
concentrated in Shandong, Hebei, Guangxi, and Guangdong Provinces. In Table 4, 
there appears to be no particular correlation between the import volume, electricity 
and steel production, and the region’s economic scale. Upon an examination of the 
unique regional characteristics, Guangdong was the largest producer of electricity, 
while Hebei produced the most steel. It is presumed that Guangdong, along the 
southern coast, uses mainly anthracite in power plants,28 while anthracite is mostly 
used in the production of steel in eastern coastal areas such as Hebei and 
Shandong.29 In particular, based on the production volume, ten out of the world’s 
top 20 steel producers are Chinese,30 most of which are in eastern coastal areas 
such as Shandong, Hebei and Jiangsu. Furthermore, it has been determined that 
overlapping investment and oversupply have become major issues due to the large 
number of small to medium steel companies in rural areas.31 
 
  
 
28“In order to reduce costs in response to weakening profitability due to the rise in the procurement price of 
coal, thermal power generation companies prefer imported products.” (Bank of Korea 2012, p.7) 
29The production volume (2013) of China’s steel (crude steel) took first place in the global market with 780 
million tons. 
30World ranking (2013): Hebei Iron and Steel (3rd), Baosteel (4th), Wuhan Iron and Steel Corp. (5th), 
Shangang Group (7th), Angang Steel Company (8th), Shougang Corp. (9th), Shandong Steel (12th), Tianjin Boai 
Enterprise (15th), Maanshan Iron and Steel (17th), Benxi Iron and Steel (19th) 
31As a response, the Chinese government recently expressed its strong will to restructure with announcements 
on penal provisions with regard to inefficient facilities and companies which continue to use obsolete equipment 
(Korea Investors Service 2014, pp.4~5)    
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TABLE 4—CHINA’S ANTHRACITE IMPORTS: DATA SUMMARY OF MAIN PROVINCES (2013) 
Province 
Import Volume 
 
(thousand ton) 
Province GDP 
 
(billion yuan) 
Electricity 
Production 
(billion kWh) 
Steel Production 
 
(thousand ton) 
Shandong 7,807 5,468 295.2  82,609 
Hebei 7,650 2,830 209.1 230,485 
Guangxi 6,694 1,438 101.3  29,392 
Guangdong 6,290 6,216 330.6  33,763 
Liaoning 3,552 2,707 101.3  67,490 
Source: KITA, CEIC. 
  
B. Regression Analysis 
 
The empirical analysis was conducted based on the previously explained 
estimations. The volumes of North Korea anthracite by region/quarter were used as 
the dependent variables in the regression analysis. Then, the demand for anthracite 
in final goods (electricity and steel production), import prices, and quarterly 
regional GDPs were used for the independent variables. Also, other control 
variables such as the physical distance between North Korea and each region, and 
the periods of UN sanctions were used. All of the variables used natural logarithm 
values to estimate how much the percent change in the independent variables 
affected the percent change in the dependent variables in each quarter.  
In order to control for the unobserved characteristics of each region, the fixed-
effects model was determined to be most appropriate. In addition, the fixed-effects 
model was preferred according to the Hausman test. Also, by including time 
dummy variables, our analysis took the trend of North Korea’s anthracite exports in 
the 2000s into consideration. 
Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis through combinational 
changes to electricity and steel production, which are the source of the demand for 
the anthracite in final goods. By including electricity production (1) in the first 
estimation, steel production (2) in the second estimation and both (3) in the third 
estimation, the significance of the combination of variables was examined.  
First, as shown in (1), electricity was found to be insignificant. Rather, it can be 
determined that the price effect is more important in that as the price of imports 
increases, anthracite imports in the corresponding quarter decrease. However, when 
steel production is included, as in (2), the demand for final goods has a very 
significant positive (+) relationship, while the price variable has negative (-) 
significance. Finally, in (3), both factors were included, and it was determined that 
while North Korean anthracite exports were strongly influenced by China’s 
regional steel production, electricity was of no particular significance. Accordingly, 
when China’s regional steel production increased by 10%, North Korean anthracite 
imports into the corresponding region also increased by 17.1%. Again, the price 
variable proved to be significant, and when the import price increased by 10%, 
North Korean anthracite imports decreased by 12.8%. On the other hand, electricity 
production, regional economies, and UN resolutions32 seem to have no particular  
 
32According to Table 5 (2), during sanction periods, North Korea increased its anthracite exports to China by 
100*(e0.5311)=0.7%. However, when considering that there was no significance in (3), the credibility of this result 
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TABLE 5—REGRESSION RESULTS: ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA33 
 (1) EP (2) SP (3) EP&SP 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
log (electricity) 0.203 0.904***   -1.058  0.0451 
 (0.702) (0.333)   (0.727) (0.321) 
log (steel)   1.525*** 1.582*** 1.711*** 1.537*** 
   (0.337) (0.228) (0.359) (0.237) 
log (price) -1.884*** -0.192 -1.235*** -0.188 -1.280*** -0.197 
 (0.386) (0.238) (0.449) (0.229) (0.449) (0.228) 
log (province GDP) -0.341 1.075*** -0.544 -0.0494 -0.419 -0.0254 
 (0.617) (0.280) (0.593) (0.294) (0.598) (0.294) 
UN Dummy 2.286** -0.283 5.311*** -0.241 1.134 -0.245 
 (1.078) (0.250) (0.959) (0.221) (1.005) (0.223) 
log (distance)  -1.199*  -0.356  -0.387 
  (0.666)  (0.661)  (0.615) 
Constant 22.55*** 16.45*** 7.821 6.645 13.68** 6.996 
 (4.885) (4.539) (5.449) (4.730) (5.716) (4.439) 
Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 330 330 325 325 325 325 
R-squared 0.571 0.186 0.528 0.242 0.532 0.241 
No. of Provinces 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
TABLE 6—REGRESSION RESULTS: ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA (REVISED DATA) 
 (4) EP (5) SP (6) EP&SP 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
log (electricity) 0.193 0.876***   -1.057 0.0149 
 (0.696) (0.332)   (0.721) (0.318) 
log (steel)   1.516*** 1.611*** 1.703*** 1.580*** 
   (0.335) (0.226) (0.357) (0.236) 
log (price) -1.850*** -0.177 -1.193*** -0.175 -1.280*** -0.178 
 (0.384) (0.237) (0.446) (0.226) (0.449) (0.226) 
log (province GDP) -0.315 1.076*** -0.523 -0.0832 -0.419 -0.0559 
 (0.613) (0.277) (0.589) (0.291) (0.598) (0.291) 
UN Dummy -3.824** -0.297 4.234*** -0.258 1.134 -0.260 
 (1.067) (0.247) (0.828) (0.217) (1.005) (0.219) 
log (distance)  -1.227*  -0.379  -0.389 
  (0.679)  (0.666)  (0.626) 
Constant 28.43*** 16.69*** 8.659 6.712 13.68** 6.902 
 (4.818) (4.630) (5.391) (4.762) (5.716) (4.505) 
Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 332 332 327 327 327 327 
R-squared 0.568 0.190 0.522 0.251 0.526 0.251 
No. of Provinces 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
is damaged. As such, it can be concluded that UN sanctions have no particular impact on North Korea-China trade.  
33Also, in order to control for the effect of the business cycle, we included real estate investments by province, 
finding that the overall results still hold (See Table A1). 
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significance. 
In Table 6, we run a regression with revised statistics for the year 2009. The data 
for August to November of 2009 are missing in the Chinese customs statistics 
(KITA data). In order to augment this, we thoroughly analyzed the data and 
concluded that the omitted period could be classified separately under the category 
of ‘other Asian trade’. Based on this, we added ‘other Asian trade 
(August~November)’ and ‘DPRK trade (January~July, December)’ for the Chinese 
customs statistics, finding that the sum of these two categories is similar to the 
amount of exports recorded for the entire year of 2009 in the UN Comtrade data 
(See Table A2 for details). As for most items, including crude oil, iron ore, and 
clothes, this trend is very consistent. Therefore, we assume that we have better data 
consistency. Also, the regression results with the revised data still hold: Chinese 
steel production matters to the export of North Korean anthracite in a positive way, 
whereas the import price affects the quantity negatively. Again, other variables 
such as economic conditions, geographical factors, and the political environment 
are not significant. 
As the regional/quarterly data on China’s anthracite production could not be 
obtained, the substitution variables for North Korean anthracite imports were not 
included in the previous estimation.34 Instead, the regional anthracite exports were 
included as a variable for estimation (Table A3). The basic premise behind this is 
that as more anthracite is produced, the export capacity increases. However, there 
is a problem with such a variable, as there are differences between regions that 
import anthracite (Guangdong, Guangxi, Shandong, Liaoning, and Hebei) and 
those that export anthracite (Shanxi, Beijing, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia) which 
as such may not affect the anthracite imports of each region. Despite this problem, 
substitute variables were used to obtain an estimate that was similar to previous 
results in Table 5 and Table 6. China’s regional steel production (2.7%) and import 
prices (-3.0%) were found to be decisive influencing factors. However, other 
variables were again found to be insignificant. 
Next the dependent variable was changed to the importing of Vietnamese 
anthracite by province. As the UN resolution dummy variable only applies to North 
Korean situation, it was not included in this estimation. According to the results of 
Table 7, in contrast to North Korean anthracite, Vietnamese anthracite was 
simultaneously affected by both electricity and steel production and was also 
negatively affected by import prices. Furthermore, in this case, the regional 
economy showed a positive (+) relationship. 
In order to increase the rigidity of the estimation, we excluded outliers in the 
case of Vietnam’s anthracite.35 However, in this estimation, the results differed in 
each case, and there was no consistency to the significance of steel production, 
which is the main variable of interest. As such, a definite conclusion with regard to 
the determinants of Vietnam’s anthracite imports was inconclusive.  
 
34Although regional/quarterly data on China’s coal production was available, the same was not true for 
quarterly data on anthracite. As the demand in final goods, e.g., the demand for anthracite in final goods and 
bituminous coal, slightly differed, this paper did not use the domestic production of coal as a variable.    
35In contrast to the data on North Korean anthracite imports, where there was only one outlier (Beijing, 4Q 
2012), there were ten outliers of abnormally high import prices in the data for Vietnam’s anthracite imports 
(Beijing 1, Shanghai 6, Wuhu 1, Hebei 1, Sichuan 1)  
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TABLE 7—REGRESSION RESULTS: ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM VIETNAM 
 (7) EP (8) SP (9) EP&SP 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
log (electricity) 1.649*** 2.070***   1.155* 1.457*** 
 (0.571) (0.420)   (0.610) (0.424) 
log (steel)   0.912*** 1.076*** 0.713*** 0.786*** 
   (0.228) (0.234) (0.250) (0.247) 
log (price) -2.835*** -1.225*** -2.724*** -1.251*** -2.737*** -1.504*** 
 (0.339) (0.251) (0.329) (0.232) (0.327) (0.243) 
log (province GDP) 3.110*** 1.019*** 3.105*** 1.060*** 2.812*** 0.683** 
 (0.867) (0.320) (0.834) (0.316) (0.844) (0.326) 
log (distance)  -3.158**  -3.860***  -3.766*** 
  (1.314)  (1.316)  (1.376) 
Constant 3.627 30.90*** 0.959 33.80*** 1.249 33.93*** 
 (3.917) (9.310) (3.959) (9.245) (3.941) (9.680) 
Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 316 316 306 306 306 306 
R-squared 0.550 0.214 0.503 0.194 0.511 0.233 
No. of Procode 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level. 
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
V. Summary and Policy Implications                       
 
This paper conducted an empirical analysis of the factors within China’s 
domestic market that influence North Korea’s anthracite exports. First, it can be 
assumed that the demand for anthracite imports in China is determined by 
electricity and steel production (final goods demand factor), import prices (price 
factor), the distance from North Korea (geographical factor) and sanctions by the 
international community (sanction factor). The results of the quantitative analysis, 
which was based on panel data constructed from quarterly cross-section data of 30 
Chinese provinces from 1998 to 2013, show that the relationship between North 
Korea’s anthracite exports and China’s steel production is positive, while that with 
import prices is negative. The remaining variables i.e., electricity production, 
economic conditions and the volume of China’s anthracite exports, proved to have 
no influence. These findings were not influenced when the variables were 
combined, and they remained consistent after a reexamination and the calculation 
of data in the third and fourth quarters of 2009. The results also coincide with the 
results from on-site investigations, showing that North Korean anthracite was being 
exported mainly to steel manufacturing companies in Rizhao (Shandong Province), 
Tangshan (Hebei Province) and Tianjin. As such, it can be concluded that the state 
of China’s regional steel manufacturing industries is a determinant of North 
Korea’s anthracite exports.36 Moreover, it was found that UN sanctions had no 
 
36According to KDI’s on-site investigation, all of the anthracite imported from North Korea was consumed in 
China. As such, there seems to be no or nearly no channels through which North Korean anthracite is exported via 
a third country. Accordingly, it was concluded that the economy of the steel industry, a final goods demand source 
of anthracite, has a significant influence on the demand for North Korean anthracite.  
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particular impact, even showing a positive relationship with North Korea’s 
anthracite exports in some cases. This finding echoes preexisting research which 
found that international sanctions had only a short-term effect on general imports 
and none on general exports.37 In the case of Vietnam’s anthracite exports, which 
is exported to China at a volume similar to that by North Korea, the empirical 
analysis results varied depending on the precision of the data, estimations and the 
combination of variables. Therefore, this model was found to be inappropriate for 
estimating the determinants of Vietnam’s anthracite exports.  
If China’s steel production and North Korea’s anthracite exports are closely 
connected, as the empirical analysis in this paper suggests, the ripple effect from 
changes in China’s regional steel industry on the demand for North Korean 
anthracite has great significance with regard to policy; considering North Korea’s 
abnormally high dependence on anthracite exports, any shift in China’s import 
demand may precipitate changes in North Korea’s economy. Specifically, problems 
could arise in an economic structure which relies on exports to import a sufficient 
amount of required goods. 
Prospects for China’s steel industry are dim. For example, China’s steel industry 
shows an excessive oversupply. Accordingly, steel prices and export prices have 
declined. Therefore, the revenue for China’s steel industry fell considerably in the 
first half of 2014.38 Notably, the Chinese central government’s will to pursue 
pertinent policies has changed somewhat since 2005.39 This shift in the policy 
stance is expected to have a greater impact on small to mid-sized rural steel 
companies with inefficient facilities, which could influence North Korea’s 
anthracite exports. Additionally, the air pollution action plan and rebalancing policy 
currently being pursued by the Chinese government are also expected to have an 
effect. Under the current plan, the Chinese government will implement varying 
levels of policies to reduce environmentally related consumption according to 
different regions. Unfortunately, these policies are set to be aggressively pursued in 
the regions where the levels of demand for North Korean anthracite are highest.40 
Furthermore, it is highly probable that the consumption-based economic changes 
within China’s economy will also affect North Korea’s anthracite exports. In 
actuality, in countries such as Taiwan, where the growth engine has shifted from 
investment to consumption and the production of consumer goods has increased, 
there has also been a rise in exports, whereas in countries such as Australia, which 
exports capital goods and resources, there has been a rapid decrease.41 Considering 
this, Australian and Indonesian companies that export anthracite to China are 
 
37Regarding this, refer to Lee et al. (2013).  
38Korea International Trade Association (Shanghai office), Current State and Prospects for China’s Steel 
Industry, August 2014.  
39“Although the central government presented a plan to streamline the steel industry in 2005, oversupply 
continued due to the passive attitude of local governments (the scale of excessive facilities is estimated at 300 
million tons). The central government expressed its strong will to pursue aggressive policies, announcing its plan 
to close 100 million tons of uncompetitive facilities by 2017 at the National People’s Congress in March of 2014 
and imposing penal penalties on local governments (e.g., power rate penalties, restrictions on bank loans, 
reductions in rural subsidies).” (Korea Investors Service, Examination of the 7 Main Issues of the Steel Industry, 
2014, pp.7) 
40The ‘Air Pollution Action Plan’ determined the following reduction targets for coal consumption (2012-
2017): Shandong 5%. Hebei 13%, and Tianjin 19% (Greenpeace, ‘The End of China’s Coal Boom,’ 2014).  
41The Economist, ‘Winners and Losers in the Great Chinese Rebalancing,’ July 26th 2014. 
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experiencing a plunge in prices and reductions in export volumes. North Korea is 
predicted to be no exception.  
Overall, this paper has revealed that North Korea’s anthracite exports are closely 
connected to the state of China’s steel industry. It is true that there are certain 
limitations to this type of empirical analysis. The exact figures pertaining to which 
industries and companies receive North Korean anthracite 42  have not been 
presented due to statistical limitations. Also, the cement and ceramics industries, 
other demand bases for anthracite, were excluded from the estimation, as there 
were no available regional and quarterly data.  
Despite this fact, this research concentrated on overcoming the fundamental 
limitations of research on North Korea’s economy. First, efforts were made to 
improve the accuracy of the estimation by correcting the problem of disaggregated 
data. Secondly, on-site investigations were conducted to check if reality was 
reflected empirically in order to verify the results of the empirical analysis. Thirdly, 
based on the research results, it was concluded that the maintenance of North 
Korea’s current trade structure will bring about fundamental limitations which 
could in turn induce changes in North Korea’s foreign policy. Although changes in 
North Korea’s foreign policy may be based on political and diplomatic factors, it 
has been proven that external economic factors could be a greater influence.43  
Given these current limitations, there is a strong possibility that North Korea’s 
will to expand and diversify its external market will strengthen; As such, the South 
Korean government needs to use these internal circumstances to establish flexible 
inter-Korean policies that can provide economic incentives to its northern 
counterpart.  
 
   
 
42Through several on-site investigations, KDI attempted to analyse the exact numbers and degrees of fact 
relevance, finding however that there were external restrictions and limitations.  
43Koh et al. (2008, p.228) empirically proved that, unlike in the past, North Korea-China trade was 
commercially motivated; however, they acknowledged that these results have limitations because they are based 
on limited data.   
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1—ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA (INCLUDING THE BUSINESS CYCLE) 
 GDP & Real Estate Real Estate 
 (1) FE (2) RE (3) FE (4) RE 
log (electricity) -1.043 0.0679 -1.412** 0.0831 
 (0.746) (0.328) (0.714) (0.300) 
log (steel) 1.704*** 1.525*** 1.913*** 1.336*** 
 (0.368) (0.243) (0.363) (0.213) 
log (price) -1.281*** -0.202 -0.934** -0.274 
 (0.450) (0.230) (0.443) (0.194) 
log (province GDP) -0.433 -0.223   
 (0.619) (0.340)   
log (province real estate investment) 0.0106 0.122 0.00937 0.119 
 (0.119) (0.110) (0.117) (0.0947) 
UN Dummy 1.123 -0.254 5.312*** -0.303 
 (1.015) (0.223) (0.980) (0.225) 
log (distance)  -0.404  -0.545 
  (0.645)  (0.534) 
Constant 13.67** 7.060 4.574 8.664** 
 (5.727) (4.640) (4.555) (3.890) 
Time Dummies Yes No Yes  No 
Observations 325 325 341  341 
R-squared 0.532 0.413 0.509 0.418 
Number of procodes  15  15  16  16 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
TABLE A2— REVISED DATA (2009) 
 
Month 
KITA 
  DPRK + Other Asia UN Comtrade DPRK Other Asia 
Volume 
(thousand $) 
Quantity 
(ton) 
Volume 
(thousand $) 
Quantity 
(ton) 
Volume 
(thousand $) 
Quantity 
(ton) 
Volume 
(thousand $) 
Quantity 
(ton) 
1 14,591 193,618 - - 14,591  193,618 
  
2 16,261 209,046 - - 16,261  209,046 
3 23,974 334,852 - - 23,974  334,852 
4 33,736 502,404 - - 33,736  502,404 
5 33,118 475,964 - - 33,118  475,964 
6 45,436 646,077 - - 45,436  646,077 
7 40,324 588,194 - - 40,324  588,194 
8 - - 34,195 471,267 34,195  471,267 
9 - - 10,177 144,874 10,177  144,874 
10 - -    485   6,745    485    6,745 
11 - -    293   3,877    293    3,877 
12   1,189    22,027 - -   1,189   22,027 
Total 208,632 2,972,187 45,152 626,764 253,784 3,598,951 256,186 3,598,163 
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TABLE A3— ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM NORTH KOREA (INCLUDING EXPORTS TO CHINA) 
 EP SP EP&SP 
 (1) FE (2) RE (3) FE (4) RE (5) FE (6) RE 
log (electricity) 1.052 0.951*   0.976 -0.383 
 (1.596) (0.513)   (1.328) (0.500) log (steel)   2.721*** 2.612*** 2.718*** 2.630*** 
   (0.438) (0.373) (0.439) (0.389) log (price) -4.720*** -0.948** -2.946*** -0.438 -2.947*** -0.371 
 (0.582) (0.387) (0.561) (0.352) (0.563) (0.361) log (province GDP) -1.146 1.879*** -1.173 -0.118 -1.221 -0.0372 
 (1.021) (0.453) (0.845) (0.475) (0.850) (0.477) log (China export) -0.117** 0.0170 -0.0633 0.0119 -0.0653 0.00791 
 (0.0534) (0.0648) (0.0450) (0.0551) (0.0452) (0.0556) UN Dummy 3.476* -0.670 1.433 -0.508 3.947* -0.483 
 (2.068) (0.431) (1.495) (0.356) (2.092) (0.361) log (distance)  -2.959***  -1.033  -0.828 
  (1.076)  (1.256)  (1.199) Constant 34.87*** 26.42*** 8.462 3.229 6.092 2.219 
 (6.928) (7.251) (6.275) (8.921) (7.070) (8.573) Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 142 142 141 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.790 0.248 0.836 0.431 0.837 0.435 
Number of procodes 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
FIGURE A1. ANTHRACITE IMPORTS FROM VIETNAM: MAIN PROVINCES 
Source: KITA. 
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